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Reforms, Growth and Persistence of Gender Gap: 
Recent Evidence from Private School Enrolment in India
* 
 
This paper examines the extent of gender gap in private school enrolment in India, an issue 
that has not been adequately addressed previously. Results based on individual level unit 
record data shows that a girl is less likely to be sent to private schools holding other factors 
constant and controlling for selection into school enrollment, and this disadvantage is 
particularly higher for younger girls in the family. The extent of gender bias in private school 
enrolment is double that of overall enrollment. Additionally, irrespective of policy reforms and 
overall economic growth, female disadvantage in rural private school enrolment appears to 
have increased over the decade 1993-94 to 2004-05. This can partly be attributed to the 
declining agricultural output as well as labour force participation rates among rural women 
over much of this period. Our results have important policy implications at a time when policy 
makers are eager to explore a potential role for private sector in delivering basic education. 
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Reforms, Growth and Persistence of Gender Gap:  
Recent Evidence from Private School Enrolment in India 
 
1: Introduction 
It has increasingly been recognised that gender discrimination hinders growth and 
development (see Duflo, 2004 for a survey). Nevertheless, female disadvantage in school 
enrolment and attainment is prevalent in many developing and emerging economies though 
relatively little is known about gender gap in private school enrolment. In this context, we 
examine the nature of gender gap in private school enrolment and also its persistence, if any, 
over time, in India’s emerging economy.  
Female disadvantage in child schooling in India has been well-established in the 
literature (see Pal, 2004; Bhaskar and Gupta, 2007 among others), though there is evidence 
that points to declining female disadvantage in literacy in the recent years (Kingdon, 2007). 
The obvious question is whether a similar trend is observed in private school enrolment. India 
launched the pro-market reforms back in 1991 and since then has experienced significant 
economic growth. This period has also witnessed a number of other constitutional/policy 
reforms (including the 73
rd constitutional amendment to reserve seats for women at the 
village council, the modification of Hindu Succession Act of 1956 to ensure women’s 
inheritance rights in all Indian states) to ensure women’s rights, resources and voices. 
However, India’s overall success story in the post-reform period seems to hide its persistent 
problem of addressing gender relations in the country. For example, a recent Times of India 
article (3 November 2011) suggests that ‘India's abysmal gender inequality statistics seem to 
have taken a turn for the worse. New data shows the country's Gender Inequality Index (GII) 
worsened between 2008 and 2011, and India now ranks 129 out of 146 countries on the GII, 
better only than Afghanistan in south Asia.’ Further Bhalla and Kaur (2010) argued that India 
still has one of the lowest labour force participation rates among urban women, which hovers 
around 25% for about last 25 years.  
Recent reforms in India have given rise to a rapid growth of private schools around 
the country. It is in this context that we examine if there is any female disadvantage in private  
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school enrolment among 7 – 18 year olds in India’s emerging economy. It is interesting to 
explore not only the extent of gender gap in private school enrolment at a given point in time, 
but also its evolution, if any, in private school enrolment during a period of rapid reforms and 
economic growth in India. This is an important but rather unexplored issue in the literature 
perhaps because parental ability to choose between private and government schools is of 
relatively recent origin, being facilitated by the recent growth of private schools around the 
country. Given the state of failing government schools across India (Drèze and Kingdon, 
2001), there have been increasing attempts among policy makers to explore the scope of 
private sector in delivering basic education in India (Tooley and Dixon, 2003; Tooley, 2004). 
It has often been argued that their greater market orientation makes private schools and 
teachers more accountable to children and parents; they are more sensitive to input costs and 
are perceived to be more efficient.  
The dismal state of the state schools in India has induced many households 
(including poor households) to take advantage of the newly emerging private schools in order 
to meet their educational needs (Drèze and Kingdon, 2001).
1  The latter has further been 
facilitated by the use of English as the medium of instruction in many private fee-paying 
schools especially in urban areas. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) argue that the returns to 
English based education has increased rapidly in India’s new economy. Using two rounds of 
All India School Education Survey (AISES) data, Pal and Kingdon (2010) highlighted the 
rapid growth of private schools (especially at the secondary level) across the Indian districts. 
Our analysis using the India Human Development Survey data too highlights the pronounced 
growth of private school enrolment in rural areas over 1993-94 to 2004-05. Private school 
enrolment rates among 7 – 18 year old children in the rural sector had more than doubled 
(increased from 8 percent in 1993-94 to 19 percent in 2004-05)  
                                                       
1While there are no fees to attend government schools, it is not the case that government schools are 
free. Parents incur substantial costs (such as expenditure on books, stationery, travel, and school 
uniforms) even when they send their children to government schools. For instance, the PROBE report 
found that, in rural north India, parents spend about Rs 318 per year on each child who attends 
government (i.e., tuition-free) school, so that an agricultural laborer in Bihar with three such children 
would have to work for about 40 days of the year just to send the children to primary school. See 
Kingdon (2005).   
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We address two questions in this paper. First, for a given year, what is the extent, if 
any, of gender bias in private school enrolment? This is analysed using the recent 2004-05 
India Human Development Survey (IHDS) data. One can envisage two opposing effects of 
private school growth on gender gap in private school enrolment. Private schools are fee-
paying schools and parents may choose to send only boys to private schools: if returns to 
boys’ private schooling are higher and/or parents have son preference because of underlying 
economic, social or religious reasons.
2 Rise of private schools may however mitigate gender 
differences in school choice by satisfying differentiated demand for girls’ schooling 
(especially for adolescent girls) in different ways: (i) providing access to local schools in 
close vicinity; (ii) providing schools with access to girls’ toilet and other infrastructural 
facilities; (iii) instruction in English in most private schools may also entail a marriage 
market premium for private school educated girls in India’s new economy (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig, 2006). Finally, private schools may be chosen for their greater efficiency by 
more educated parents who might be more enlightened and therefore more likely to send both 
boys and girls to such schools (provided they can afford paying private school fees). The net 
effect of private school growth on gender gap is therefore likely to be ambiguous and we 
explore it empirically in this paper.  
Further, family composition might be an important consideration here. Whether a 
child belongs to a mixed (with both boys and girls) or a single (only girls or only boys) 
gender household can have important implications for parental investment in private schools. 
Parents who choose to send daughters to private schools might not be a random subset of the 
population of all parents; they are likely to be more enlightened in terms of attitudes to 
gender equality and might behave in a more altruistic manner than the rest.
3  First in an 
                                                       
2Sons may be preferred over daughters for a number of economic, social and religious reasons, 
including financial support, old age security, property inheritance, dowry, family lineage, prestige and 
power, birth and death rituals and beliefs about religious duties and salvation. 
3  The existing empirical literature however does not appear to have any clear consensus on how 
important altruism is in affecting parental behaviour. For example, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) in 
analyzing parental allocations in response to differential boy-girl survival data from rural India, 
conclude that compensating parental investment is not the dominant behaviour, but rather parents act 
to reinforce initial differences. Behrman and Wolfe (1982) however conclude that parents care about  
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environment where there are both boys and girls, altruistic parents might not be willing to 
exhibit open discrimination and this is likely to benefit girls from mixed-gender (as opposed 
girl-only) households (see Dasgupta, 1987 and Butcher and Case, 1994). Second, there is a 
growing literature (mainly from developed countries) that argues that gender of the children 
may also influence parental preferences. Warner (1991) and Warner and Steel (1999) have 
shown that policies designed to address gender equity is greater among parents with 
daughters in America and Canada. Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) find that parents with 
girls are more likely to support left-wing parties in the US. Extending this argument to the 
context of South Asia, it is possible that parents who have girls might be less discriminating 
and hence may be willing to invest more in girls; this can influence gender gap in parental 
human capital investment. A further possibility pertains to an income effect (perceived or 
otherwise). The potential lifetime income of households is higher in the presence of a boy 
(they are likely to co-reside when adults, provide old age security to parents and so on) and 
this makes households think that they are richer. To the extent that investing in girls’ 
schooling is a normal good, parents with boys may be more likely to invest in girls’ schooling 
by sending them to private school. In other words, the effect of gender composition of 
children on private school enrolment is an empirical issue to be examined.   
Our second hypothesis pertains to whether gender gap in private school enrolment 
has changed over a decade of rapid economic growth and policy reforms during the 1990s. 
How do we expect economic (and indeed legislative and judicial) reforms and the associated 
economic growth to affect the gender gap in private school enrolment? First, economic 
growth is likely to improve the well being of everyone, but disproportionately more for 
women who lag behind men in many respects. Policy reforms directly targeted at women (for 
example, constitutional reforms to reserve seats for women in local councils or gradual 
                                                                                                                                                            
children’s earnings inequality and tend to provide additional resources to the less able child than is 
consistent with an investment model. More recently, Li, Rosenzweig and Zhang (2010) find evidence 
of multiple motivations at work in China, providing evidence of altruism, favouritism and guilt, 
towards the children (one of the twins) who experienced more years of rustication following Mao’s 
Mass Send-down Movement in the 1960’s and 1970’s. These children received higher parental 
transfers despite having higher earnings.   
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modification of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 so that all women have rights to inherit) 
would empower women by ensuring their rights, resources and voice - the result could be a 
decline in gender gap.
4  The positive effects of growth/policy reforms could however be 
negated somewhat if counter forces may set in as a result of these reforms and growth. First, 
the agricultural sector in India experienced a dramatic contraction during the 1980s and 
1990s in India. Bardhan (2005) argues that India’s economic liberalisation has been driven by 
growth in the service sector at the cost of the agricultural sector. The result has been 
declining output/income and higher poverty in the rural sector. Second, Chamarbagwalla 
(2006) argues that trade in manufactures has lowered the skilled wages for women in India 
while trade in services has increased it during the post reform period so that the total effect of 
liberalisation and reform on skilled wages for women may be ambiguous. Finally, using 
National Sample Survey (NSS) data, Bhalla and Kaur (2010) show that labour force 
participation rates of rural women aged 15 – 59 have declined from 53 percent in 1993-94 to 
45 percent in 2004-05. Female labour force participation rates among urban women is 
considerably lower and has not changed much for the last 25 years with an average of about 
23 percent. Taken together, these adverse developments, especially for the rural sector, may 
induce lower investment in girls and hence a rising gender gap over this period despite higher 
economic growth and other policy reforms favouring women. Access to two rounds of IHDS 
data for 1993-94 and 2004-05 (IHDS1 and IHDS2 respectively) for the rural sector gives us a 
unique opportunity to explore if the gender gap in private school enrolment has been 
increasing over the eventful decade 1993-94 to 2004-05.
5  
For the purposes of this paper, we restrict ourselves to children aged 7 – 18 years in 
households with at least two children in this age group and provide selectivity corrected 
                                                       
4 Greater inheritance rights may affect human capital investment of girls at least in two possible ways. 
First, it can increase the marriage market premium for women, therefore inducing greater parental 
investment in girls’ education. Second, greater inheritance rights may also induce women to take 
greater interest in household property management, thus encouraging the complementarity between 
inheritance rights and education. Both of these are likely to result in parents’ investing more in 
daughters' education. 
5 While this data allows us to trace changes in gender gap in parental school choice over this decade, if 
any, we are unable to identify the causal effects of these economic/legal/constitutional reforms. We 
hope future research will address this shortcoming.  
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estimates of private school enrolment. Our results suggest that relative to boys, 7 – 18 year 
old girls (irrespective of whether they are from single gender or mixed gender households) 
tend to have more than six percentage point lower likelihood of private school enrolment. 
Further, relative to 1993-94, this female disadvantage is significantly higher (by about 5 
percentage points) in 2004-05 among rural girls; this higher female disadvantage prevalent in 
2004-05 may be attributed to the adverse effects of the reforms on the rural sector, declining 
skilled wage for women and/or falling labour force participation rates among rural women 
during this decade. There is a significant inter-state variation in the degree of female 
disadvantage in private school enrolment: compared to the southern and the western states, 
the extent of female disadvantage is significantly higher in the large north Indian states. 
Finally the gender gap vanishes for 15 – 18 year old girls from girl-only households, which 
perhaps reflects the aspect of differentiated demand for girls’ private schooling in this age 
group; though it could also be facilitated by older boys’ withdrawal from the private schools 
for participation in the job market, for example.   
Existing literature on private schools focuses on relative efficiency of public and 
private school (Kingdon, 1996; Muralidharan and Kremer, 2006), location choice of private 
schools (Pal, 2010) and also the effect of private school growth on universal literacy (Pal and 
Kingdon, 2010). While Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) analysed the case of female 
advantage for enrolment in English Medium schools for a small low-caste community in 
Mumbai,
6 what is missing is a systematic analysis of gender gap in private school enrolment 
across the country. The present paper not only bridges this gap in the literature, but also 
provides some new insights pertaining to the change of gender gap over time. We find that 
there is gender gap in private school enrolment just as there is gender gap in any school 
enrolment; however more importantly, female disadvantage in private school enrolment 
(about 6 percentage points) is almost double the size of that of in any school enrolment (3 
                                                       
6 Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) argued that boys are sent to local language state schools to boost 
network advantage despite significant increase in returns to English-medium education in the post 
reform period. Girls are free from such network links and parents were free to send them to private 
English medium schools.   
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percentage points). Second, there is evidence that gender gap in private school enrolment is 
significantly higher among younger children (relative to the oldest ones) in the households. 
Further analysis highlights favourable effect of mother’s schooling on lowering female 
disadvantage in private school enrolment; we also explore the inter-state variation in the 
extent of female disadvantage. Finally we find that the gender gap in private school 
enrolment in the rural sector is significantly higher in 2004-05 (relative to 1993-94). This can 
be attributed to the declining rural income and output, declining labour force participation 
rates among rural women as well as declining skilled wage for female in India during much 
of this period.   
2. Data and Selected Descriptive Statistics 
There are three broad types of recognized schools in India, namely government schools, 
private aided schools and private unaided schools. Government and private aided schools are 
typically government recognized, i.e., they have the government stamp of approval. They are 
similar in many respects since private aided schools are almost entirely financed by the 
government and have little control over staffing (hiring/firing decisions) and fee levels, 
despite being nominally private managed. In our analysis we do not distinguish between 
government and private aided schools, instead we combine them under the broad umbrella of 
government schools. Private unaided schools (whether recognized or not) enjoy more 
autonomy compared to private aided schools and are typically self-funded out of fee income. 
Thus the private unaided schools are the truly private schools in India.
7 Private  unaided 
(henceforth private) schools typically offer instructions in English. Table 1 compares selected 
characteristics of private and government schools over the period 1992 – 2002. The biggest 
difference between private and government schools is in terms of infrastructure and pupil-
teacher ratios. As of 2002, 71 percent of the private schools have a toilet, compared to 41 
percent of government schools; 91 percent of private school have drinking water facilities 
                                                       
7 Private unaided schools can be further categorized into religious and non-religious schools, though 




compared to 78 percent of government schools. The pupil-teacher ratio in government 
schools is often twice that in private schools. All of this suggests that private schools offer a 
better quality of education in India (Kingdon, 1996). Other differences between private and 
government schools include the fact that compared to government schools, a greater 
proportion of teachers in private schools are women and are likely to be of a higher caste. 
This is possibly because as of 2002, the private sector, even the private educational sector, 
was not constrained by caste based affirmative action (reservation) policies.  
This paper primarily uses data from the Indian Human Development Survey 2005 
(IHDS2 data set). This is a nationally representative, multi-topic survey of 41,554 households 
in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighbourhoods across India collected by the National 
Council of Applied Economic Research and the University of Maryland. The survey 
collected information on health, education, employment, economic status, marriage, fertility, 
gender relations, and social capital. The survey was conducted between November 2004 and 
October 2005 with a response rate of more than 90 percent. We also compare the results of 
the IHDS2 survey with the IHDS1 survey conducted in 1993-94 (available only for the rural 
sample). This comparison will allow us to explore if there has been any change in the gender 
bias in school choice over the decade. To analyze the issue of gender bias in a specific year, 
we restrict ourselves to using the IHDS2 data. The choice of this data set is primarily driven 
by the fact that this survey has a broader coverage (it includes both rural and urban 
households) compared to the IHDS1 data. 
   Figure 1 presents the enrolment rates by age and gender for the IHDS2 data set. Two 
observations are worth noting. First, the enrolment rates are very high (more than 80 percent) 
for children aged 7 – 11; they start falling beyond the age of 11, going down to 25 percent for 
boys and 20 percent for girls by age 18. This drop in the later years is possibly a reflection of 
boys leaving schools in search of employment and girls leaving school because they have 
attained the age of marriage. Second, the enrolment rates for girls are consistently lower 
compared to that of boys and this difference persists over the entire age range. Figure 2 
presents the average enrolment in private schools by age and gender, conditional on  
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enrolment. For children aged 7 – 15 (but not so for those aged more than 15), the private 
school enrolment rate for boys is consistently higher than that of girls; beyond age 15 
however the gender gap appears to reverse in favour of girls. Figure 3 presents private school 
attendance by age and gender, categorized by household type. Boys aged 7 – 15 (irrespective 
of the household type) are more likely to be enrolled in a private school compared to girls 
(again irrespective of the household type). Boys aged 7 – 15 belonging to single gender 
households are more likely to be enrolled in a private school compared to boys belonging to 
mixed gender households. For girls aged 7 – 15 there is no persistent household type effect. 
Interestingly for both boys and girls aged more than 15 there is no persistent pattern in 
private school enrolment by household type.  
Table 2 presents both overall school enrolment rates and private school enrolment 
rates (conditional on enrolment) by gender for different sub-samples of the population. There 
is a systematic pro-male bias of about 6 percentage points for private school enrolment for 
the whole sample; while the pro-male bias in private school enrolment exits for all sub-
groups, they are lower for certain subgroups like Muslims. While children belonging to 
backward castes are not particularly less likely to be enrolled in school (compared to the 
overall sample average), private school enrolment rates of children belong to backwards 
castes is significantly lower. Second, both enrolment rates and private school enrolment rates 
are monotonically increasing over expenditure quantiles and this is true for both boys and 
girls but pro-male bias in private school enrolment increases monotonically as we move up 
from the lowest to the highest expenditure quartile. Third, there is a big drop in enrolment 
rate for the 15 – 18 year olds: the drop is 47 percent for the full sample and is 50 percent for 
the sample of females. Conditional on enrolment, private school enrolment rates are fairly 
consistent across the different age categories. It is here that we find less evidence of pro-male 
bias.  
Table 3 presents the sample averages for the variables used in the analysis. Column 
(1) presents the averages for the IHDS2 all households. 48 percent of children in the sample 
are girls. Mothers are in gender less educated compared to fathers; 30 percent of the sample  
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resides in urban areas; 79 percent of children are Hindus and 30 percent belong to lower 
castes; 73 percent belong to mixed gender households.  
In order to analyse the nature of gender gap in private school enrolment, we not only 
consider the gender of the child, but also distinguish between single and mixed gender 
households. Table 4 summarises the selected characteristics by household type.  Interestingly 
there is no difference in private school enrolment rates between mixed and single gender 
households. Conditional on being a multi-child household, 73 percent of households are 
mixed gender households. For the full IHDS2 sample, the average size of households is 7.04; 
mixed gender households are slightly larger (7.3 members on an average) compared to single 
gender households (6.3 members on an average). Fathers are more educated compared to 
mothers – 5.3 years on average, compared to 2.8 years (see Table 3), the educational 
attainment of fathers and mothers is higher in single gender households compared to mixed 
gender households. While the full sample average number of children (defined as the average 
number of individuals less than or equal to 18) in the household is 2.9, it is 3.03 in mixed 
gender households and 2.56 in single gender households. Single gender households tend to be 
richer as highlighted in per capita household consumption expenditure. This is possibly 
because on the one hand the single gender households are smaller in size and on the other the 
educational attainment (therefore the income levels) are higher in single gender households. 
3. Methodology 
While the primary focus of this paper is on school choice and in particular private school 
enrolment of Indian children, one needs to remember that school choice is conditional on 
school enrolment in the first place. This selection issue is important as more than 27 percent 
of children aged 7 – 18 are not enrolled in school at the time of the survey. Define    
   as the 
propensity of the     child from the     household is enrolled in a private unaided (henceforth 




     
                (1)
Now    
    (the propensity of the child attending private school) is not observed; what we 
observe instead is a binary variable      1  if the     child from the     household is enrolled 
in a private school at the time of the survey and 0 otherwise.  
Private school enrolment     is observed only if the     child from the     household 
is enrolled in school at the time of the survey       1   . In estimating equation (1) we 
therefore have to account for a selection problem where the selection equation is defined by: 
     
                (2)
where     
    (the propensity to attend school) is not observable. We only observe 
    where      1  if    
   0 ;      0  otherwise.  
Given the binary nature of both the enrolment      and private school choice     
variables, we use a bivariate probit model with selection correction to estimate equation (1). 
  and   are the two sets of explanatory variables in equations (1) and (2) respectively and   
and   are IID error terms. The set of explanatory variables   and   in equations (1) and (2) 
include some common variables like age categories, gender of the child, age of the household 
head, whether the household head reads newspapers regularly, years of schooling of the 
mother and father, religion (Hindu, Muslim, Christian) and expenditure quartiles,
8 urban/rural 
residence and state of residence to capture all other unobserved characteristics including 
policy effects. We also compare the uncorrected private school enrolment equation with the 
corrected ones to see the extent of the bias, if we do not correct for the potential selection bias.  
  For the first stage enrolment (selection) equation to be identified, we need at least 
one variable that affects the probability of enrolment but not that of the school choice 
decision. In this respect, we choose the total number of schools per 1000 children in the 
district, which is included in the enrolment equation only. It is expected that access to schools 
would directly affect the probability of enrolment, but not the private school choice. 
                                                       
8 Given the potential endogeneity problem associated with household income, we use expenditure 
quartiles, which have the added advantage of specifying some ranges rather than the actual values of 
the expenditure.   
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Following Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) and Pal (2010) we assume that private school 
choice is a reflection of the state of state schools rather than the total number of schools in the 
district of residence. This is further confirmed by re-estimating the school choice equation by 
including this variable (total number of schools per 1000 children in the district) in the set of 
explanatory variables    . This variable is not statistically significant in the school choice 
regression and the other results remain qualitatively unchanged.
9  Finally we include the 
availability of private unaided schools in the district (number of private unaided schools per 
1000 children) in the school choice regression only; this accounts for the access to private 
schools in the district and is likely to be directly important for the choice between public and 
private schools.  
  The most conventional way of testing gender bias in the private school choice 
regression is to include a gender dummy (GIRL) in the school choice regression (equation 
(1)). However that gives us the average effect across all households and the effects will be 
contaminated by the fact that there are some single child households that are likely to be 
different in many ways from multiple children households. In order to fully understand the 
extent of gender bias within each household we need to restrict the sample to multiple 
children households. One added advantage of focusing on multiple children households is 
that it allows us to control for household level unobserved heterogeneity or household level 
unobserved characteristics that affect enrolment (first stage) and private school choice 
(second stage) of all children in the household that would otherwise bias the estimates. All 
standard errors are clustered at the household level.   
Within the restricted realm of multiple children households, it is likely that the 
gender composition of children matters. It has been argued that a girl child will be worse off 
if it belongs to a girl-only household. For example, Dasgupta (1987) argues that girls are 
nutritionally worse-off if they come from girl-only households (also see Pal, 1999 for the 
case of West Bengal in India). Butcher and Case (1994) highlight the educational advantage 
                                                       
9 We also exploit the non-linear nature of the likelihood function to identify the index equation for 
private school enrolment (without any exclusion restriction). The results are very similar (see Table 6). 
Our results are therefore not driven by the specific exclusion restrictions.   
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of girls in the US if they have male siblings. We define single gender households as those 
where all children aged 18 or below are of the same gender: boy only in the case of all boys 
and girl only in the case of all girls. To examine how gender composition of siblings affects 
the school choice (and indeed enrolment decisions) and also gender bias within the household, 
we include a mixed household dummy (MIXED) and also an interaction term GIRL  × 
MIXED). This allows us to examine whether girls from mixed gender households enjoy 
(suffer) any advantage (disadvantage) relative to girls from single gender households. Thus 
the augmented school choice equation can be rewritten as follows: 
     
                                                            (3)
Where     captures the differential private enrolment effects of girls from mixed gender 
households. Other control variables      in equation (3) include a set of age dummies 
(reference category age = 18), parental educational attainment, rural/urban residence, religion 
(Hindu, Muslim, Christian), caste (SC/ST), per capita expenditure, total private schools in the 
district and a set of state dummies (to account for any other unobserved policies that might 
affect the likelihood of choice of school). We also examine the robustness of the selectivity 
corrected baseline regression results for private school choice (as in equation (3) above) in a 
number of ways. This includes assessing the role of context child’s birth order as well as each 
parent’s education and household expenditure (as a proxy of household wealth) on female 
disadvantage in private school. We also explore the variation in female disadvantage not only 
across the Indian states, but also across various sub-samples including Muslim, SC/ST and 
rural households.  
Our second hypothesis pertains to a change in gender bias in school choice, if any, as 
a result of the on-going process of reforms and growth in India. To examine this we pool the 
data from the IHDS1 and the rural sample of the IHDS2 data to estimate the following 
regression: 
   
                                                      2  (4)




The coefficients of interest for us are the estimated values of    and   , which highlight the 
differential effects of GIRL and GIRL  MIXED for IHDS2 sample.  
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Gender bias in 2004-05 (IHDS2) 
Table 5 presents the first stage (current) enrolment estimates and Table 6 presents the 
corresponding selectivity corrected estimates for the private school enrolment equation.
10 In 
both cases we present the marginal effects, which are much more easily interpreted. We 
present results corresponding to a number of different specifications. In Specification 1 we 
only include the gender of the child (GIRL). Specification 2 in addition controls for the mixed 
gender household type (MIXED). Specification 3 allows for outcomes to be different across 
mixed and single gender households by including the interaction term GIRL × MIXED.
11 
Column (4) of Table 6 also shows the non-selectivity corrected estimates of private school 
enrolment (corresponding to specification 3). It is worth specifying the interpretation of the 
three variables in specification 3. Here the GIRL dummy captures the relative (dis)advantage 
of a girl in a single gender household (relative to a boy in a single gender household). The 
MIXED household dummy captures the mixed household (dis)advantage of boys, relative to a 
boy in a single gender household. Finally the GIRL × MIXED interaction term captures the 
differential effect of girls from mixed gender households relative to those in single gender 
households.
12  
Table 5 presents the marginal effects from a probit regression of school enrolment 
decision. It follows that a girl from a single gender household is 3 percentage points less 
                                                       
10 The full sets of estimates corresponding to Tables 5 and 6 are presented in Tables A1 and A2 
respectively. 
11 In all specifications we control for the age of the child, parental educational attainment, rural/urban 
residence, household size, whether anyone in the household reads newspapers regularly, age of the 
head of the household, expenditure quartile and a set of province dummies.  
12 To be specific the coefficient estimate associated with the GIRL × MIXED interaction term gives: 
(average private school enrolment of girls in mixed gender households – average private school 
enrolment of boys in mixed gender households) – (average private school enrolment of girls in girl 
only households – average private school enrolment of boys in boy only households). Since girl only 
and boy only households are by definition single gender households, the D-I-D estimate can be 
interpreted as (Average gender difference in private school enrolment in mixed gender households) – 
(Average gender difference in private school enrolment in single gender households).     
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likely to be enrolled in school; however the differential effect of girls from mixed gender 
households (captured by the marginal effect associated with the interaction term GIRL × 
MIXED) is positive and it is significant at the 10 percent level of significance. If we add up 
the two estimated coefficients, the total gender effect, ceteris paribus, is still found to be 
negative for enrolment decisions in our sample. This implies that girls from mixed gender 
households are discriminated less, though the total gender effect continues to be negative.  
Table 6 presents the estimates of private school choice for the different specifications. 
The marginal effects corresponding to the GIRL variable in Specifications 1 and 2 presented 
in Table 6 imply that there is significant female disadvantage as the girl dummy is negative 
and significant. The marginal effects corresponding to the MIXED dummy in Specifications 2 
and 3 however remain insignificant. Further, the coefficient estimate of GIRL × MIXED in 
specification (3) turns out to be statistically not significant. In other words, there is no 
evidence from our analysis that there is a significantly differential effect on girls from mixed 
gender households relative to that in single gender households. Overall girls are almost 6 
percentage points less likely to attend private school compared to boys, controlling for a full 
set of other individual and household characteristics and for selection into enrolment. The 
corresponding uncorrected estimates shown in column (4) shows similar results; the extent of 
gender gap is slightly higher at 7 percentage points. Not accounting for selection into 
enrolment then slightly over estimates the gender bias.  
Table 6 also presents the results for the selectivity corrected private school enrolment 
without any exclusion restriction (column 5) and the selectivity corrected models for private 
school enrolment for the full sample including single child households (column 6). The 
estimates in column 5 are almost identical to those presented in column 3; in other words 
non-linearity of the likelihood function appears to be sufficient to identify the index equation. 
When we include single child households, girl disadvantage is slightly less but interestingly 
the single child dummy is now positive and statistically significant. This implies that single 
children are more likely to attend private schools. This is possibly a manifestation of  
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household resources, though it should be noted this this single child effect persists even after 
we have controlled for the permanent income of the household.    
4.2 Robustness 
Table 7 presents the selectivity corrected estimates of private school enrolment where we 
assess the role of father’s education, mother’s education and household per capita income 
(proxied by per capita expenditure). The years of schooling attained by the father and mother 
are categorized into four quartiles and three dummies for quartiles 2, 3 and 4 (Q2, Q3, Q4) 
are included as additional covariates (with Q1 dummy being used as the reference category). 
In addition, we also include quartile dummies (Q2, Q3 and Q4) for household expenditure as 
additional controls (to capture the household income/resource availability effect). The 
differential effect of parental education and wealth on girl enrolment in private school is 
captured by including interaction of the education and wealth quantiles with the GIRL 
dummy. These interaction terms with the gender dummy account for the differential gender 
effects of each parent’s education and also household resources on private school enrolment 
in our sample. The likelihood of private school enrolment increases monotonically for girls as 
we move from second to third and third to fourth quartiles for mother’s education (the 
interaction terms between mother’s schooling quartiles and the girl dummy are statistically 
significant); in contrast, the differential effect of father’s education on private school 
enrolment of girls remains insignificant in our sample. In particular, the differential 
likelihood of a girl to be enrolled in private schools increases by about 4-5 percent points in 
households as mother’s education increases from Q1 to Q2, Q3 or Q4. This result is 
consistent with existing evidence (Schultz, 2002) in the literature, which suggests that 
mother’s education is crucial for female school enrolment.   
Ceteris paribus, the estimates presented in Table 7 show a monotonically increasing 
positive effect of wealth on enrolment for both boys and girls (4.3 percentage points, 7.7 
percentage points and 19 percent points at Q2, Q3 and Q4 respectively) and a significant 
differential effect for girls only at Q3 of expenditure. Thus for households in Q3 quantile 
(upper middle class) female discrimination in enrolment is lower by 3.3 percent.  
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In a society with a pronounced preference for male children as in India, the 
significance of the birth order cannot be ignored. Dasgupta (1987) and Pal (1999) find that in 
India relative to the eldest girl, younger (or higher order) girls suffer from significant 
nutritional disadvantage. We seek to examine whether this result holds in terms of private 
school enrolment as well. In order to examine this, instead of the GIRL dummy, we include 
two dummies to capture the birth order of girls: ELDEST and HIGHER_ORDER and also 
include interactions of these two dummies with the mixed gender household dummy 
(MIXED). Table 8 presents the corresponding birth order effects for the selectivity corrected 
private school choice decision. For the full sample, the eldest girl is 3.7 percentage points less 
likely to attend private school while an younger (higher order) girl is 6 percentage point less 
likely to do so. The differential effect of girls from mixed gender households although 
positive is not statistically significant. It therefore follows that a higher order girl is 
significantly more disadvantaged compared to the eldest girl and this finding is compatible 
with what Dasgupta (1987) observed for intra-household allocation of nutrition.  
In Table 9 we present the marginal effects from the state-level probit regressions for 
private school enrolment.
13  There is indeed a great deal of variation across the different 
provinces. In particular the pro-male bias in private school enrolment is more pronounced in 
the northern states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh and considerably weaker in the southern and western 
states. The GIRL dummy is not statistically significant for Gujarat and Maharashtra in 
western India and for the southern states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
14 For Gujarat, Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu, there is no evidence that girls are less likely to be enrolled in private schools 
relative to boys, irrespective of whether the girls belong to single gender or mixed gender 
households. The greater female disadvantage in the large north Indian states can perhaps be 
explained by the relatively more pronounced effect of Sanskritization (Berreman, 1993) in 
                                                       
13 Here the sample is restricted to the set of enrolled children only. We are unable to explicitly account 
for selection because of convergence problems in many of the cases.  
14  Our results for the state of Maharashtra are therefore compatible with those of Munshi and 
Rosenzweig (2006).    
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these north Indian states (relative to the southern and western states of India). Additionally 
the lack of land reform, greater caste-hierarchy and inequality in the northern states, which 
hinder socio-political and economic development can potentially explain the heterogeneity 
across the Indian states. 
Table 10 examines the robustness of these results across different sub-samples and 
population groups by examining the selectivity corrected estimates for private school 
attendance for different sub-samples: Muslim households (column 1), low caste SC/ST 
households (column 2), rural and urban households (columns 3 and 4 respectively) and also 
for age groups 10 – 14 and 15 – 18 (columns 5 and 6 respectively).
15 As with the baseline 
regression estimates for private school choice (Table 6), these results confirm that, relative to 
boys, girls are always disadvantaged (see test of GIRL + GIRL × MIXED = 0). However the 
strength of the effect varies across the different subsamples: in particular the bias is weak for 
children aged 15 – 18. In this age category girls from single gender households are treated no 
differently compared to boys, the interaction term GIRL  ×  MIXED is however negative 
indicating a worse total effect for girls.  
4.3 Change in Gender Gap over 1993-94 – 2004-04 
To start with, we compare the average trends in our data for the two years 1993-94 and 2004-
05 (IHDS1 and IHDS2 respectively). The descriptive statistics presented in columns 2 and 3 
in Table 3 allow a preliminary comparison across the two survey years. First the school 
enrolment rate has increased significantly – from 54 percent in 1993-94 to 71 percent in 
2004-05. The private school enrolment rates have increased from 9 to 18 percent over the 
corresponding period and the increase is quite systematic across all population sub-groups. 
The smallest effect is for the poorest (Q1) households, though even here the effect is positive. 
There is evidence of improvement in school infrastructure and school quality over the period, 
                                                       
15 This however assumes that different data generating processes drive the results for the different sub-
samples. To examine whether this assumption is crucial to our analysis, instead of running regressions 
on the different sub-samples, we included interaction terms within the full sample. The results were 
however very similar and therefore for ease of understanding and explanation we present and discuss 
the results for the different sub-samples.  
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particularly in terms of lower pupil-teacher ratios in upper primary and secondary schools 
(see Table 1).  
  Table 11 presents the selectivity corrected estimates for the pooled IHDS1 and 
IHDS2 data sets for the rural households only. Column (1) presents the results for the full 
sample while columns (2) and (3) those for the sample of 10 – 14 and 15 – 18 year olds 
respectively. Overall private school enrolment is significantly higher in 2004-05, relative to 
1993-94; in particular, the marginal effect of IHDS2 is 14.8 percentage points. However, the 
estimated coefficient of            2  is negative and statistically significant while the 
coefficients involving mixed gender households remain insignificant. In other words, girls are 
4.6 percentage point less likely to be enrolled in private schools in 2004-05. Taken together, 
the total effect of IHDS2 turns out to be 0.148 - 0.046 = 0.102; therefore, relative to 1993-94, 
there is a 10.2 percentage point higher private school enrolment in 2004-05, net of 4.6 
percentage point increased discrimination against girls. There is however no evidence that 
this has happened for 15 – 18 year old girls in our sample. In other words, despite the 
beneficial effects of various reforms (including the ones directly targeted at women) and 
economic growth, female disadvantage in private school enrolment in rural India is 
significantly higher in 2004-05 (compared to 1993-94) and this effect seems to be dominated 
by adverse impact on the 7 – 14 year old children in our sample.   
5: Conclusion  
Gender gap in different walks of life in India is well established. It also appears that despite 
decades of development gender gap is rather persistent in the country. The present paper 
focuses on a particular aspect of the gender gap – the gender gap in private school enrolment 
that remains rather unexplored partly because private school choice has been facilitated by 
the recent liberalisation reforms in India.  
School choice is a central theme in contemporary strategies for education reform. By 
giving parents more choices about the schools their children attend, and opening up the 
education system to competition from new actors including the private sector, policymakers  
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hope to make existing public and private schools more efficient and more effective. Our 
results suggest that ceteris paribus there is evidence of significant female disadvantage in 
private school enrolment; the gender gap in private school enrolment is not only higher than 
that for any school enrolment, but also that this gender gap in private school enrolment in the 
rural sector is significantly higher  in 2004-05 (relative to 1993-94). These results confirm the 
fear of the critics of school privatisation that it may increase segregation, and have adverse 
effects on disadvantaged students, for example, females or those from poorer socio-economic 
background (see Cullen, Jacob and Levitt, 2005).  
From a policy point of view this is a relevant and timely study. Politicians and policy 
makers are eager to explore a potential role for private sector in delivering basic education. 
While growth and poverty reduction can help everyone including women, it appears that 
growth and poverty reduction is not sufficient for fighting gender gap in private school 
enrolment in our sample. In addition to the efforts to improve the quality of government 
schools through decentralisation and local autonomy of public service providers, direct 
policies seeking to provide incentives for girls’ school participation and attainment, improved 
labour market opportunities and also enhanced returns to women’s skills are likely to go a 
long way to redress female disadvantage in schooling, which may otherwise grow in an era of 
growing austerity in public spending.  
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Figure 1: Enrolment Rates by Age and Gender (IHDS2)  
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Table 1: A comparison of government and private unaided schools, 1992-2002 
  Private schools Government schools 
  1992  2002 1992 2002 
  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Percentage of 
female teachers in 
total 
      
     Primary  0.55 (0.26)  0.55 (0.24) 0.35 (0.23) 0.38 (0.15)
     Upper primary  0.50 (0.27)  0.50 (0.24) 0.30 (0.21) 0.32 (0.17)
     Secondary  0.45 (0.26)  0.44 (0.22) 0.28 (0.20) 0.24 (0.19)
Percentage of low 
caste teachers 
      
     Primary  0.09 (0.13)  0.11 (0.13) 0.22 (0.19) 0.24 (0.19)
     Upper primary  0.08 (0.13)  0.10 (0.12) 0.17 (0.14) 0.23 (0.17)












0.84 (0.17)  0.91 (0.13) 0.58 (0.24) 0.78 (0.17)
Pupils per teacher        
     Primary  30.7 (12.5)  34.3 (31.6) 39.1 (16.2) 67.1 (70.5)
     Upper Primary  30.8 (11.2)  20.6 (50.0) 31.5 (11.5) 35.3 (58.3)
     Secondary  29.1 (10.9)  13.7 (23.0) 28.1 (8.4) 29.7 (19.1)
Source: Pal and Kingdon (2010) 
Note: Government schools do not include private aided schools  
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Table 2: Enrolment and Private school enrolment rates:  IHDS2 All 
  Enrolment Private School Enrolment, conditional on Enrolment 
  All Females Males All Females Males 
Sample Average 0.73 0.70 0.75 0.28 0.25 0.31 
Rural  0.71 0.68 0.74 0.19 0.15 0.21 
Urban  0.76 0.75 0.77 0.50 0.47 0.53 
Hindu  0.76 0.73 0.78 0.27 0.24 0.29 
Muslim  0.56 0.53 0.58 0.36 0.35 0.37 
SC/ST  0.68 0.66 0.70 0.17 0.14 0.19 
Father’s Education (Q1)  0.54 0.50 0.56 0.16 0.13 0.18 
Father’s Education (Q2)  0.67 0.65 0.69 0.29 0.26 0.32 
Father’s Education (Q3)  0.77 0.75 0.79 0.28 0.24 0.34 
Father’s Education (Q4)  0.87 0.85 0.89 0.40 0.37 0.42 
Mother’s Education(Q1)  0.60 0.57 0.63 0.20 0.16 0.23 
Mother’s Education (Q2)  0.74 0.73 0.74 0.43 0.39 0.46 
Mother’s Education (Q3)  0.78 0.75 0.80 0.32 0.31 0.34 
Mother’s Education (Q4)  0.90 0.89 0.90 0.38 0.35 0.41 
Q1 (Poorest Households)  0.61 0.59 0.63 0.15 0.13 0.18 
Q2  0.68 0.65 0.70 0.21 0.19 0.23 
Q3  0.75 0.73 0.77 0.28 0.26 0.29 
Q4 (Richest Households)  0.85 0.83 0.86 0.43 0.40 0.46 
Single Gender Household  0.76 0.76 0.75 0.29 0.24 0.32 
Mixed Gender Household  0.71 0.69 0.74 0.28 0.26 0.30 
Age 7 – 9  0.88 0.87 0.89 0.29 0.26 0.32 
Age 10 – 14 0.83 0.80 0.85 0.28 0.24 0.31 

















Table 2b: Enrolment and Private school enrolment rates:  IHDS1 All 
  Enrolment Private School Enrolment, conditional on Enrolment 
  All Females Males All Females Males 
Sample Average 0.53 0.47 0.59 0.08 0.07 0.10 
Rural  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Urban  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hindu  0.54 0.46 0.61 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Muslim  0.45 0.42 0.48 0.13 0.11 0.15 
SC/ST  0.44 0.37 0.51 0.06 0.04 0.07 
Q1 (Poorest Households)  0.47 0.39 0.54 0.06 0.04 0.07 
Q2  0.48 0.41 0.54 0.08 0.07 0.09 
Q3  0.55 0.49 0.60 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Q4 (Richest Households)  0.65 0.61 0.69 0.10 0.10 0.11 
Single Gender Household  0.54 0.49 0.58 0.09 0.08 0.10 
Mixed Gender Household  0.53 0.46 0.60 0.08 0.07 0.09 
Age 7 – 9  0.63 0.56 0.70 0.08 0.06 0.10 
Age 10 – 14 0.60 0.51 0.69 0.08 0.07 0.08 
















Table 2c: Enrolment and Private school enrolment rates:  IHDS2 Rural 
  Enrolment Private School Enrolment, conditional on Enrolment 
  All Females Males All Females Males 
Sample Average 0.70 0.67 0.73 0.18 0.15 0.21 
Rural  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Urban  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hindu  0.73 0.70 0.76 0.17 0.14 0.20 
Muslim  0.51 0.48 0.53 0.21 0.21 0.22 
SC/ST  0.68 0.66 0.70 0.11 0.08 0.13 
Q1 (Poorest Households)  0.61 0.59 0.64 0.07 0.05 0.10 
Q2  0.65 0.62 0.69 0.14 0.11 0.16 
Q3  0.72 0.70 0.74 0.16 0.14 0.18 
Q4 (Richest Households)  0.82 0.79 0.84 0.31 0.28 0.34 
Single Gender Household  0.72 0.72 0.72 0.19 0.14 0.22 
Mixed Gender Household  0.70 0.66 0.74 0.18 0.16 0.21 
Age 7 – 9  0.87 0.85 0.89 0.18 0.15 0.21 
Age 10 – 14 0.81 0.78 0.84 0.18 0.15 0.22 





Table 3: Selected characteristics of IHDS1 and IHDS2 samples 
  IHDS2 IHDS1 IHDS2 
  All  Rural Rural 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
Female  0.48  0.50 0.46 0.49 0.48  0.50 
Household Size  7.04  3.00 7.32 3.01 7.26  3.14 
Number of 
Children 
2.90  1.81 3.29 1.24 3.04  1.87 
Number of Adults  2.94  1.56 3.55 8.69 3.03  1.62 
Per Capita HH 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
721.64  609.32 N/A N/A 643.58  553.50
Per Capita HH 
Income 
7671.31  9656.27 4176.03 5458.73 6222.94  7702.98
 
Age  12.37  3.24 12.35 3.29 12.33  3.24 
Years of Schooling 
Father 
5.30  4.67 N/A N/A 4.63  4.43 
Years of Schooling 
Mother 
2.79  4.02 N/A N/A 2.01  3.40 
Urban   0.30  0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Hindu   0.79  0.41 0.81 0.39 0.83  0.37 
Muslim   0.15  0.36 0.13 0.34 0.11  0.32 




0.60  0.76 0.10 0.30 0.46  0.67 
Head Age  46.08  10.99 45.65 9.68 46.61  11.34
Enrolled   0.73  0.45 0.53 0.49 0.71  0.45 
Enrolled in Private 
School 








Table 4: Sample Characteristics by Household Type 
  IHDS2 All   IHDS1   IHDS2 Rural  















Female  0.50 0.43 0.48 0.39 0.50 0.43 
Household Size 7.29 6.34 7.64 6.47 7.53 6.51 
Number of Children 3.03 2.56 3.53 2.64 3.17 2.67 
Number of Adults 2.98 2.84 3.43 3.14 3.08 2.90 
Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (Rs.) 703.81 769.58 N/A N/A 632.53 674.58 
Per Capita HH Income (Rs.)  7453.27 8280.60 4145.90 4256.38 6183.41 6338.24 
Age  12.46 12.15 12.39 12.19 12.40 12.13 
Years of Schooling Father  5.19 5.61 N/A N/A 4.56 4.81 
Years of Schooling Mother  2.61 3.26 N/A N/A 1.90 2.30 
Urban   0.29 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hindu   0.78 0.82 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.85 
Muslim   0.16 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 
SC/ST  0.29 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.32 
Head: Reads newspaper regularly  0.59 0.65 0.10 0.10 0.45 0.47 
Head Age  46.30 45.48 46.19 44.21 46.87 45.86 
Enrolled   0.71 0.76 0.53 0.54 0.70 0.73 
Enrolled in Private School  0.28 0.29 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.19 




Table 5: Marginal effects from Probit Estimation of Current Enrolment  
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Girl  -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.034*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
Mixed Gender Household    -0.000 -0.036*** 
     (0.006) (0.014) 
Girl × Mixed Gender Household      0.016* 
     (0.010) 
Observations  28917 28917 28917 
Test of (Girl + Girl × Mixed 
Gender Household) = 0
   177.04*** 
Notes: 
Regressions control for age of the child, parental educational attainment, rural/urban residence, 
household size, whether any acquaintance of the household is a teacher, whether any one in the 
household reads newspaper regularly, age of the household head, expenditure quartile, number of 
schools in the district and a set of state dummies. Full set of results presented in Table A1. 




Table 6: Selectivity Corrected Marginal Effects of Private School Choice. Baseline Regressions 
















Girl  -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.057*** -0.067*** -0.057*** -0.049***
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010)
Mixed Gender Household    -0.000 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
     (0.008) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
Girl × Mixed Gender Household     -0.003 0.006 0.008 0.002
      (0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.010)
One Child          0.035***
          (0.011)
Observations 28917 28917 28917 20981 28917 33703
Number Enrolled 20981 20981 20981    
Test of (Girl + Girl × Mixed 
Gender Household) = 0 
   80.39*** 62.30*** 177.04*** 112.02***
Wald Test of Independent 
equations:      0;   1   
19.61*** 19.54*** 20.20***    
Notes: 
Regressions control for age of the child, parental educational attainment, rural/urban residence, household size, whether anyone in the household reads 
newspaper regularly, age of the household head, expenditure quartile and a set of state dummies. Full Set of results presented in Table A2. 




Table 7. Selectivity corrected marginal effects of private school enrolment: Effects of 
parental aspirations and wealth 
 
Variables  Marginal effects 
Effect of Mother’s education and interactions  
Mother’s edu_Q2  -0.003 
  (0.020) 
Mother’s edu_Q3  0.025* 
  (0.014) 
Mother’s edu_Q4  0.090*** 
  (0.016) 
Mother’s_edu_Q2× Girl  0.044* 
  (0.025) 
Mother’s_edu_Q3× Girl  0.047*** 
  (0.017) 
Mother’s_edu_Q4× Girl  0.050*** 
  (0.018) 
Effect of Father’s education and interactions  
Father’s edu_Q2  0.043*** 
  (0.015) 
Father’s edu_Q3  0.052*** 
  (0.015) 
Father’s edu_Q4  0.077*** 
  (0.016) 
Father’s_edu_Q2× Girl  -0.001 
  (0.017) 
Father’s_edu_Q3× Girl  0.001 
  (0.018) 
Father’s_edu_Q4× Girl  -0.003 
  (0.010) 
Effect of Household wealth and interactions  
Expenditure_Q2  0.043*** 
  (0.016) 
Expenditure_Q3  0.077*** 
  (0.016) 
Expenditure_Q4  0.190*** 
  (0.019) 
Expenditure_Q2× Girl  0.012 
  (0.020) 
Expenditure_Q3× Girl  0.033* 
  (0.020) 
Expenditure_Q4× Girl  0.004 
  (0.018) 
Wald Test of Independent Equations:      0;   1    11.51*** 
Observations  28,917 
Notes: 
Regressions control for girl, girl× mixed, mixed household, age of the child, rural/urban 
residence, household size, whether anyone in the household reads newspaper regularly, age of 
the household head, and a set of state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 8: Birth order effects. Selectivity corrected marginal effects of private school 
enrolment 
  Private School
Eldest girl  -0.037** 
  (0.016) 
Higher order girl  -0.064*** 
  (0.013) 
Eldest girl × Mixed Gender Household 0.006 
  (0.019) 
Higher order girl × Mixed Gender Household 0.009 
  (0.017) 
Mixed Gender Household  -0.003 
  (0.011) 
Observations  28917 
Number enrolled  20981 
Test of (Eldest girl + Eldest girl × Mixed Gender Household = 0) 25.76*** 
Test of (Higher order girl + Higher order girl × Mixed Gender Household 
=0) 
77.27*** 
Wald Test of Independent equations:      0;   1    9.93*** 
Notes: 
Regressions control for age of the child, parental educational attainment, rural/urban 
residence, household size, whether anyone in the household reads newspaper regularly, age of 
the household head, expenditure quartile and a set of state dummies 





Table 9: Marginal effects of private school choice by state 
VARIABLES
Girl  Mixed Gender 
Household




Test of (Girl + Girl × Mixed 
Gender Household = 0) 
Jammu and Kashmir -0.127  0.082 0.084  488 0.77
(0.099)  (0.101) (0.108) 
Himachal Pradesh -0.114** -0.102* 0.070  917 8.89***
(0.047)  (0.056) (0.054) 
Punjab  -0.201*  0.030 0.114  935 8.40***
(0.107)  (0.072) (0.119) 
Haryana  -0.115*  0.008 0.019  1,475 8.97***
(0.070)  (0.041) (0.068) 
Rajasthan  -0.175*** -0.053 0.068  1,967 12.25***
(0.041)  (0.038) (0.054) 
Uttar Pradesh -0.113** 0.030 0.020  2,820 20.44***
(0.047)  (0.035) (0.055) 
Orissa  0.008  0.047 -0.031  921 1.13
(0.047)  (0.033) (0.048) 
Madhya Pradesh -0.064*  -0.008 -0.029  2,410 23.43***
(0.037)  (0.027) (0.042) 
Gujarat  0.042  0.037 -0.060  1,281 1.66
(0.046)  (0.030) (0.045) 
Maharashtra -0.001  -0.007 -0.033  2,092 5.90**
(0.039)  (0.026) (0.043) 
Andhra Pradesh -0.178*** -0.030 0.075  1,287 20.47***
(0.055)  (0.047) (0.062) 
Karnataka  -0.088*** -0.062** 0.052  2,195 3.00*
(0.033)  (0.030) (0.042) 
Kerala  0.021  0.015 0.026  771 2.66
(0.067)  (0.050) (0.083) 
Tamil Nadu 0.033  0.079** -0.035  917 0.06
(0.041)  (0.039) (0.042)  
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Age 10 – 
14 
(5)
Age 15 – 
18 
(6)
Girl  -0.013 -0.036* -0.040*** -0.060** -0.063*** -0.037
  (0.028) (0.020) (0.010) (0.030) (0.018) (0.029)
Mixed Gender Household  0.001 -0.001 0.011 -0.006 -0.005 0.039
  (0.031) (0.023) (0.011) (0.041) (0.023) (0.031)
Girl × Mixed Gender Household  0.001 -0.013 -0.005 0.010 0.003 -0.019
  (0.020) (0.011) (0.007) (0.021) (0.014) (0.022)
Observations 4431 8483 20319 8598 14092 8443
Number Enrolled 2463 5792 14421 6560 11652 3684
Test of (Girl + Girl × Mixed Gender 
Household = 0)
5.15** 28.23*** 73.17*** 18.53*** 72.72*** 3.75*
Wald Test of Independent equations: 
     0;   1   
0.64 5.98** 9.55** 8.19** 2.70 2.78*
Notes: 
Regressions control for age of the child, parental educational attainment, rural/urban residence, household size, whether anyone in the household reads 
newspaper regularly, age of the household head, expenditure quartile and a set of state dummies 




Table 11. Gender gap over time: Marginal effects estimates of private school enrolment, pooled rural IHDS1 and IHDS2 samples 
 
  Full Sample  10 – 14   15 – 18 
Girl  -0.007 -0.029 0.057
  (0.012) (0.022) (0.118)
Girl × Mixed Gender Household -0.006 0.019 -0.037
  (0.013) (0.028) (0.082)
Mixed Gender Household -0.008 -0.015 0.002
  (0.008) (0.024) (0.019)
Girl × IHDS2 -0.046***  -0.029 -0.119
  (0.013) (0.053) (0.264)
Girl × Mixed Gender Household × IHDS2 -0.005 0.006 -0.023
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.052)
Mixed Gender Household × IHDS2 0.027 -0.011 0.129
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.226)
IHDS2  0.148***  0.188 0.241
  (0.038) (0.154) (0.445)
Observations 43779 21204 12520
      
      
 
Notes: 
Regressions control for age of the child, parental educational attainment, rural/urban residence, household size, whether anyone in the household reads 
newspaper regularly, age of the household head, expenditure quartile and a set of state dummies 











Mixed Gender HH -0.036***
(0.014)
Girsl X Mixed Gender HH  0.016*
(0.009)
School Acquaintance  0.002***
(0.000)
7 Years Old (Dummy)  0.227***
(0.004)
8 Years Old (Dummy)  0.230***
(0.004)
9 Years Old (Dummy)  0.228***
(0.004)
10 Years Old (Dummy)  0.258***
(0.005)
11 Years Old (Dummy)  0.225***
(0.004)
12 Years Old (Dummy)  0.251***
(0.005)
13 Years Old (Dummy)  0.226***
(0.005)
14 Years Old (Dummy)  0.213***
(0.005)
15 Years Old (Dummy)  0.189***
(0.005)
16 Years Old (Dummy)  0.151***
(0.006)
17 Years Old (Dummy)  0.102***
(0.009)
Father's years of schooling  0.020**
(0.008)
Mother's Year of Schooling  0.050**
(0.022)












Reads Newspaper regularly  -0.001*
(0.000)
Age of HH head  -0.153***
(0.014)
Per capita expenditure (1st quartile) -0.089***
(0.012)
Per capita expenditure (2nd quartile) -0.052***
(0.011)
Per capita expenditure (3rd quartile) 0.060***
(0.006)






























Tamil Nadu  0.076***
(0.014)
Observations  28917
Robust standard errors in parentheses





Table A2: Full set of results for Specification 3 Second stage private school enrolment 




Mixed Gender HH -0.003
(0.011)
Girsl X Mixed Gender HH  0.008
(0.017)
Total Private Schools  0.015***
(0.003)
7 Years Old (Dummy)  0.170***
(0.034)
8 Years Old (Dummy)  0.166***
(0.033)
9 Years Old (Dummy)  0.175***
(0.034)
10 Years Old (Dummy)  0.153***
(0.031)
11 Years Old (Dummy)  0.170***
(0.035)
12 Years Old (Dummy)  0.130***
(0.028)
13 Years Old (Dummy)  0.124***
(0.027)
14 Years Old (Dummy)  0.134***
(0.027)
15 Years Old (Dummy)  0.093***
(0.020)
16 Years Old (Dummy)  0.066**
(0.026)
17 Years Old (Dummy)  0.027
(0.025)
Father's years of schooling  0.006***
(0.001)
Mother's Year of Schooling  0.009***
(0.001)












Reads Newspaper regularly  0.040***
(0.006)
Age of HH head  -0.000
(0.000)
Per capita expenditure (1st quartile) -0.126***
(0.009)
Per capita expenditure (2nd quartile) -0.099***
(0.009)
Per capita expenditure (3rd quartile) -0.069***
(0.006)






























Tamil Nadu  -0.156***
(0.008)
Observations  28917
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 